The St. 
.
The nine jurors were comprised of prominent engineers and contractors from Los Angeles, each volunteering their services for nothing. They included Los Angeles hydraulics engineer Irving C. Harris (foreman), mining engineer Sterling C. Lines, structural engineers Blaine Noice, Oliver G. Bowen and Chester D. Waltz, general engineering contractor William H. Eaton, Jr., real estate appraiser Harry G. Holabird, contractor and insurance executive Ralph F. Ware, and Z. Nathanial [Nate] Nelson.
Although none of the Jurors appears to have had any formal expertise in geology or foundation engineering, they possessed considerable technical training in civil/structural engineering and heavy construction, which is revealed in the technical content of their inquiries and the timeless wisdom of their concluding recommendations and findings, which have been quoted in countless articles, standards, and publications relating to dam safety, which advanced the need for external peer review of dams and establishment of the nation's premier state dam safety agency, the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) of the California Department of Water Resources (DWR).
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The City of Los Angeles' Bureau of Waterworks and Supply (BWWS) engineers who had worked on the design, construction, and maintenance of the St. Francis Dam and two adjacent Powerhouses in San Francisquito Canyon were questioned at length about the St. Francis Dam in late March and early April 1928 in downtown Los Angeles. A number of glaring inconsistencies emerged from the testimonies of the various individuals queried by the jurors, the County's Deputy District Attorneys, and their technical experts, who produced their own report (Mayberry et al., 1928) . Some of these inconsistencies with what the Inquest jurors felt was good practice are briefly summarized below.
BASE-TO-HEIGHT RATIO
BWWS prepared a preliminary design of the St. Francis Dam in July 1923, which was very similar to the gravity arch structure that they had recently designed, then called Weid Canyon Dam. Situated in the Hollywood Hills near the east side of Cahuenga Pass, it was referred to as the Hollywood Dam during construction, which began in August 1923. It was renamed Mulholland Dam when the structure was formally dedicated on March 17, 1925 (the body of water it retains is known as Hollywood Reservoir).
The original design envisioned concrete monolith rising 175 feet above the bed of San Francisquito Creek, with a "chopped toe," shown in Fig. 1 . The maximum reservoir capacity was to be 30,000 acre-feet (ac-ft). In July 1924 the reservoir capacity was increased to 32,000 acft by adding 10 feet to the dam's height, which required a wing dike extended westward about 600 ft from the dam's right abutment. City crews began placing concrete in August 1924. In July 1925 BWWS decided to raise the dam another 10 feet (to elevation 1835 feet), this time increasing the reservoir capacity to 38,168 ac-ft. 1639 ft. The last step is clearly observed in construction photos at the time (Outland, 1977) , five feet below Outlet No. 1, at an elevation of 1645 ft. The cross section presented by BWWS to all of the investigative panels after the failure was not an accurate portrayal of the dam's maximum section, especially with regards to estimating the factor of safety with regards to cantilever overturning (even ignoring uplift).
These discrepancies resulted in erroneous evaluations of the dam's static stability by most of the investigative panels in 1928 (Rogers, 1992; . Rogers and McMahon (1993) showed that the dam's maximum section became unstable in cantilever overturning when the reservoir rose to elevation 1830 ft, seven feet below the spillway sill. Although ignored in the original design, the arch stresses began exceeding 7000 pounds per square foot (psf) at elevation 1822 ft, increasing to 10,000 psf at elevation 1830, five feet below spillway crest. The reservoir had been brought up to within 4 ft of the spillway for 17 days in mid-May 1927, but was not filled to capacity until March 2, 1928, 10 days prior to the failure (Fig. 2) . 
ASSUMED COEFFICIENTS OF FRICTION
One of the most vexing aspects of the St. Francis Dam failure was the sheer size of the dam's displaced blocks of concrete. Some weighing as much as 10,000 tons were transported more than a kilometer downstream of the dam, and water was observed to be seeping from the dam's concrete monoliths for weeks after the failure, testifying to the fact that mass concrete was nearly as impermeable as most had assumed.
For these reasons, a significant number of questions probed into the coefficient of friction assumed by the dam's designers. W.W. Hurlbut, the senior BWWS Office Engineer stated that his office assumed the same coefficient of friction on St. Francis that had been employed at figure would have been between 0.36 (20 degrees) and, at most, 0.58 (30 degrees). In his third examination, Bayley stated that the actual figure used in the design was 0.60, which would equate to 31 degrees.
There was no accounting for diminution in the coefficient of friction when the rock material was saturated. William Mulholland responded that he assumed the mass concrete was more or less impenetrable to seepage. The jurors also inquired about whether the BWWS design team performed a basal sliding analysis, using stand-alone sections (vertical strips) of the dam. They were informed that they had not.
PAUCITY OF FOUNDATION EXPLORATION
The poor quality of the arkosic Vasquez conglomerate exposed in the dam's right (western) abutment was confirmed when specimens of the gypsiferous horizons were observed to disintegrate rapidly upon submersion in a glass of water. Many hours were taken up with inquiries about how the dam site was explored and characterized, especially in regards to the quality of the rock exposed in its abutments.
Almost all of the BWWS engineers who testified at the inquest were asked questions about the geologic characterization and appraisal of the dam site. The jurors had been given copies of the basic design plans, but nothing with any details about the dam site, except for plane table maps of the topography. The jurors asked about what sort of site exploration had been carried out on the dam site, "for the purpose of determining whether they could put a dam up there?" Witness after witness replied that "they didn't know." They were asked to produce "a plan, a diagram, or a log, or by whatever name you may call it, of the formations taken from the core of the dam site?"
The witnesses responded that there was "a record of those wells which were put in there in connection with the drainage system under the dam. Those were drilled down away into bedrock." Another witness told the inquest that a "shot drill" was used at the St. Francis dam site to drill the cores (shot drills employed steel ball bearings to grind through the rock, using a hollow cylinder drill bit). They were informed that "those cores were taken and inspected on the ground by Mr. Mulholland and others."
The jurors then asked to "see the cores," but were told that the cores had been stored in one of the exploratory adits "30 or 40 feet long in the left abutment just downstream of the dam," and that these had all been lost in the landslide of the east abutment during the failure. No
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Records preserved the LADWP Archives suggest that 10 shallow borings were made in the channel of San Francisquito Creek to probe the depth of the channel gravels (Fig. 3 ). These were drilled in two parallel lines, along the dam's axis, three being 4 m deep and the remaining seven being 8 m deep. These are the same holes utilized as uplift relief wells beneath the upstream third of the main dam. The sloping abutments and wing dike were not explored by anything more than open trenches at the time of construction and were bereft of any uplift relief. J. E. Shankland testified that the deepest point of excavation beneath the main portion of the dam approached a maximum depth of 9 m in the cofferdam trench, but "shallower preceding downstream." He estimates the depth of abutment excavations to have been about 3.6 to 4.3 m, after sluicing off loose materials with water hoses. He recalled excavating a cutoff trench about one meter deep and wide on the right abutment, which was "feathered to zero, upstream." In addition, the steam shovel excavated a shear keyway for the dike section, which was about 4.3 m wide. On the left abutment Shankland thought his crews only excavated about 1.8 m into the schist, encountering "hard material," as determined by resistance to "pick and shovel." Bayley cited the two principal references he used in the design of Hollywood Dam as being Morison & Brodie (1916) and Wegmann (1922) . The answers provided by Hurlbut, Bayley, Hemborg, and Phillips suggest that BWWS never attempted to provide internal drainage within Hollywood or St. Francis Dams, nor did they provide uplift relief under the sloping abutments. Internal drains had been included in the Olive Bridge cyclopean masonry gravity dam in New York, but that was one of the only masonry dams so fitted prior to the mid-1920s.
FOUNDATION EXCAVATIONS AND KEYWAYS

ALLOWANCE FOR UPLIFT RELIEF
GROUTING OF TRANSVERSE SHRINKAGE CRACKS
BWWS Office Engineer Edgar A. Bayley was then queried about the absence of expansion
[contraction] joints in St. Francis Dam. Bayley stated that "many engineers place these at 50 foot intervals, but Mr. Mulholland does not -he just grouts the shrinkage cracks after they occur." He then conceded that "the prevalent practice in current times has been towards employing expansion joints," and mentions other mass concrete dams then under construction, including: Exchequer, Don Pedro, Lancha Plana (Pardee), San Gabriel at the Forks, and Pacoima Dams. All of these projects were employing contraction joints. The Forks Dam was then under construction in San Gabriel Canyon, and was slated to be 29 times the volume of St. Francis Dam.
William Mulholland chose to forego the insertion of regular contraction joints, which would have required additional formwork and insertion of waterstops. When asked why BWWS did not employ water stops, Bayley replied these were not used "because they are patented." The alternative practice was to grout or caulk shrinkage cracks after they developed. The Governor's Commission opined that many existing concrete masonry dams had been built prior to 1928 without using contraction joints (Committee Report, 1928, p.15) .
During the testimony of Edgar Bayley he laid the responsibility for handling shrinkage, stresses, keys, and post-construction grouting of Hollywood and St. Francis Dams on William Mulholland, the Chief Engineer. He asserted that Mr. Mulholland and other designers "have done so without employing regular contraction (shrinkage) joints, which are grouted after the concrete has cured some amount. Phillips stated that "these cracks extended all of the way through the dam." He noted that the apertures of most of the shrinkage cracks were initially between 1/8 th and 3/16ths of an inch at the crest of the dam (Fig. 6) . What engineers didn't understand at the time was that the width was inconsequential; it was the transverse connectivity with the dam's upstream face that impacted internal stability.
Phillips went onto describe how the shrinkage cracks were caulked with oakum; a mixture of hemp or jute fiber that was often smeared with tar, creosote, or asphalt to caulk seams in wooden ships and packing pipe joints. He noted that BWWS crews drilled holes into the dam World Environmental and Water Resources Congress 2017 and "grouted the big cracks." The oakum was placed on the downstream face of these cracks to keep the cement grout from "running out," as sketched in Fig. 7 . LA Bureau of Power & Light (BPL) bus driver Henry Reiz described the various attempts to plug the tension cracks in the downstream face of the dam, stating "They put sacks to cork it," using "rope" to plug the crack at the face." Hemp rope was inserted into cracks "long after the dam was completed" (in January and February 1928). Reiz said that "Mr. Jackson was the construction foreman" involved with this work on the dam. Jackson had previously supervised the steam shovel and trucks used on the dam construction. All of the dam's visible shrinkage cracks were plugged from the downstream face, including the one on the dike section. Fig. 8 .
SUPERVISION OF THE DAM'S DESIGN
After the jurors had completed their inquiries of W.W. Hurlbut, the examination was passed onto Deputy District Attorney A.J. Dennison. He asked Hurlbut about the blueprints brought to the Inquiry, specifically, if they were "for the St. Francis Dam?" He replied that these are the "original drawings" used in the construction of the dam, but that their supporting computations were in the files at their office.
Dennison 
CONCLUSIONS
The maximum cross section of St. Francis Dam provided by BWWS after the failure was not entirely factual, suggesting a higher base-to-height ratio than actually existed. This oversight appears to have been missed by the various investigative panels, who did not perform independent verifications of the dam's dimensions.
The testimony suggests that the only engineering design work was carried out for the maximum cross section of the Hollywood Dam; and that this design was subsequently applied to the topography of the St. Francis site in San Francisquito Canyon. Bayley's calculations appear to have been limited to a static analysis of the dam's highest section, estimating the factors of safety against 1) cantilever bending/overturning; and, 2) basal sliding.
The dam collapsed 10 days after the reservoir's initial filling, to within three inches of the spillway sill. This condition would have represented the maximum pore water pressure being applied to the dam mass and its foundations.
The coefficients of friction assumed for the foundation materials were inappropriately low for planes of foliation in mica schist, and for gypsiferous horizons in the arkosic conglomerate, which was subject to slaking upon submersion.
Foundation exploration was minimal, consisting of 10 shot borings in the stream channel and one exploratory adit 30 to 40 feet long into the Pelona Schist on the left abutment, just downstream of the dam. Keyway excavations into the sloping abutments were also minimal, the deepest being between 3.6 and 4.3 m.
No accommodation for uplift relief was installed beneath the sloping abutments, which were comprised of contrasting materials (mica schist and arkosic conglomerate, separated by a fault). The fault could also have served as a significant aquitard, restricting downward percolation of seepage from the reservoir through the right abutment.
The dam was unknowingly constructed against an ancient bedrock landslide complex developed in the Pelona Schist. This was identified by Prof. Bailey Willis of Stanford University after the failure (Willis, 1928) , and evaluated in some detail by Rogers (1992 Rogers ( , 1993 Rogers ( , and 1997 . Elevated pore water pressure in the old landslide likely served to reactivate a small portion of this mass, about six times greater mass than the dam.
William Mulholland's decision to caulk and grout the transverse shrinkage cracks in January and February 1928 (Fig. 7) likely triggered the dam's untimely demise a few weeks later. Mulholland's goal was to save precious water being lost through the cracks, but caulking the fissures with oakum on the downstream face served to trap reservoir water pressure within the dam itself, a potentially catastrophic situation because it would have hastened internal instability. This condition is born out to a noticeable degree in the downstream tilt of about one degree, recorded by the Steven's Gage on Block 1 of the dam, beginning around 8:30 PM on March 12 th , 3-1/2 hours before the failure 2007) . Few people at the time understood the destabilizing impacts of pore water pressure beneath concrete arch dams, which were altered radically by the failure of Malpasset Dam in France in 1959. After considering the 840 pages of testimony, the Coroner's Jury concluded: "A sound policy of public safety and business and engineering judgment demands that the construction and operation of a great dam should never be left to the sole judgment of one man, no matter how eminent, without check by independent authority, for no one is free from error, and checking by independent experts will eliminate the effect of human error and insure safety."
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